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Abstract
Self-employed workers account for between 8% and 30% of participants in the
labor markets of OECD countries, Blanchflower (2004). This paper develops and
estimates a general equilibrium model of the labor market that accounts for this
sizable proportion. The model incorporates self-employed workers, some of whom
hire paid employees in the market. Employment rates and earnings distributions
are determined endogenously and are estimated to match their empirical
counterparts. The model is estimated using the British Household Panel Survey
(BHPS). The model is able to estimate nonpecuniary amenities associated with
employment in different labor market states, accounting for both different
employment dynamics within state and the misreporting of earnings by
self-employed workers. Structural parameter estimates are then used to assess the
impact of an increase in the generosity of unemployment benefits on the
aggregate employment rate. Findings suggest that modeling the self-employed,
some of whom hire paid employees implies that small increases in unemployment
benefits leads to an expansion in aggregate employment.
Keywords: Self-employment; job search; firm growth
JEL Classification: J21; J24; J28; J64
1 Introduction
The proportion of total employment made up by the self-employed in the U.K.
rose steadily over the period 2000-2004. The number of self-employed increased
by 8.9% compared with an increase of 0.1% of paid employees. This growth was
across gender, region, and industry, Lindsay and Macauley (2004). Over this pe-
riod the average self-employment rate was at 11.5% of total employment and this
large proportion is not unique to the United Kingdom: across all OECD countries
this proportion varied from 8-30%, Blanchflower (2004). Overall employment, wage
determination and dynamics across the two sectors are clearly intrinsically linked,
especially when one also considers that in the U.K. one third of all the self-employed
hire at least one paid employee, Moralee (1998). Considering the size and impor-
tance of self-employment, literature that incorporates it into a model of the labor
market is relatively sparse.
This paper develops a search-theoretic general equilibrium model of the la-
bor market that incorporates self-employed individuals. The self-employed en-
trepreneurs are treated in a Schumpeterian way, as a source of innovation, Schum-
peter (1934, reprinted in 1962)[1]. It is distinct from other labor market models of
[1]For a comprehensive discussion of the history of economic thought regarding entrepreneurship
see He´bert and Link (1988).
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self-employment in that after innovation the self-employed agent can work on their
own, as an own-account worker, or begin hiring workers from a labor market with
search frictions. The importance of incorporating the self-employed into an equilib-
rium model of the labor market is seen by looking at simulations of labor market
policy. Conventional wisdom would suggest a rise in unemployment benefits would
have an adverse effect on aggregate unemployment - workers require better job of-
fers or better ideas to exit unemployment for paid or self-employment respectively.
Introducing the self-employed as a source of job creation introduces a counterweight
to this straightforward mechanism. If only sufficiently good ideas create employment
opportunities, making the self-employed more fastidious about which ideas to act
on could create employment opportunities for other agents. This paper finds that
for small increases in the generosity of unemployment benefits aggregate employ-
ment increases. This is used as an illustrative example to show the importance of
considering the self-employed when implementing active labor market policy.
In the model there are two types of agents, large private sector firms who vary in
their productivity and ex ante homogeneous workers who are exposed to innovative
ideas which arrive at an exogenous Poisson rate that is dependent on their labor
market status. When an agent gets an idea its quality is drawn from a known
distribution and the agent decides whether to act on it. If they choose to start a
business, then depending on the quality of the draw they may commence attempting
to hire workers as paid employees. Thus paid employees are either hired by large
firms or self-employed recruiters. All workers are finitely lived and when in paid
employment are exposed to an exogenous probability that they lose their job; all
wage offers and job arrival rates to paid employment are determined endogenously.
This rich setting allows for a multitude of avenues in which the two sectors are
interlinked.
The model is structurally estimated using the British Household Panel Survey
(BHPS). The identification strategy allows primitive productivity distributions and
hiring behavior of both types of firm to be uncovered. The distribution of productiv-
ity amongst large firms is uncovered, as in Bontemps et al (2000) by an inversion of
the wage offer distribution; the productivity amongst the self-employed is obtained
directly from their earnings; and hiring behavior is estimated in order to match
the distribution of firm size amongst large privately owned companies and small
firms owned by self-employed recruiters. Estimates suggest that the productivities
of the two types of firms are very similar, however self-employed owned firms are
responsible for a much smaller share of employment because they face much greater
frictions in hiring paid employees. It is necessary to uncover output and hiring
through the guise of an equilibrium model as there exist large limitations of data
on the self-employed. Data are specifically limited in information regarding the re-
cruiting self-employed. The BHPS is useful as it distinguishes the self-employed
between those who hire paid employees and those who do not. However, it does not
identify the paid employees who are hired by recruiting self-employed nor does it
provide information on output. Therefore in order to infer rates of hiring and pro-
duction the paper leans heavily on a model that provides a great deal of structure
to the data.
There are models that embed self-employment into a labor market equilibrium.
However there are none, to the author’s knowledge, that allow for the two distinct
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types of self-employment discussed. Kumar and Schuetze (2007) develop a model of
the labor market that incorporates self-employment and assess the effect of changes
to unemployment insurance and the minimum wage on labor market equilibrium.
Self-employed hire paid employees as in this paper, but unlike this model there is
no wage dispersion within sector nor are there any movements across sectors. Thus
they restrict a direct interaction between the two sectors. Narita (2014) and Mar-
golis et al (2014) allow for wage dispersion within sector and structurally estimate
the parameters of their models using data from Brazil and Malaysia, respectively.
However, unlike Kumar and Schuetze (2007) and this paper, the self-employed are
restricted to being own account workers (they are restricted from hiring). Also, al-
though they allow for more mobility than Kumar and Schuetze (2007), they still
omit any direct transitions between paid and self-employment.
Although not all concern themselves with self-employment, perhaps the most
similar papers methodologically are Meghir et al (2015), Bradley et al (2015) and
Milla´n (2012). All introduce another sector into an equilibrium labor market setting
allowing for a great deal of mobility between and across sectors, be it an informal,
public or self-employed sector. Decisions made by workers depend not only on the
wage they are offered but future prospects associated with the sector. Milla´n (2012)
suggests that self-employment is used as a route out of unemployment. This paper
does not consider this hypothesis, but workers may be encouraged to become self-
employed as they face the opportunity of starting a business which can grow. Only
Kumar and Schuetze (2007) and this paper entertain the idea of the self-employed
as employers and only this paper distinguishes between the self-employed as own
account workers and recruiters.
The consensus in the empirical literature is that there exists a substantial paid
employment premium over being self-employed. Hamilton (2000) finds that tak-
ing into account within sector earnings growth and without distinguishing between
own account self-employed and recruiters, there is a 35% differential between me-
dian earnings of a self-employed individual and a paid employee with ten years of
experience in the U.S. To rationalize workers’ career choices, “results suggest that the
nonpecuniary benefits of self-employment are substantial”. Critiquing the shortcom-
ings of the existing literature Hamilton (2000) goes on to say “results presented here
are of a reduced form [...] structural estimates of the compensating wage differential,
for example, would require [...] the probability of observing particular employment
and earnings sequences”. To my knowledge, this is the first paper that attempts
to structurally estimate the nonpecuniary benefits of self-employment while taking
into account different employment options, including starting and growing one’s
own business. A priori it is not clear which sector has the preferable employment
and earnings profile. On the one hand, those in paid employment are better exposed
to other jobs in paid employment and can climb the job ladder thusly. However,
the self-employed are far more likely to become recruiters. If their firm successfully
grows so will their earnings. Consistent with the empirical literature, this paper too
finds a large positive amenity associated with self-employment.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents and solves the
equilibrium model. Section 3 presents the data, which corrects the earnings of the
self-employed, attempts to validate assumptions made in the model and explains
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the moments used for identification. Section 4 outlines the estimation protocol, the
results and the fit of the model. Section 5 runs counterfactual policy simulations to
asses the effects of increasing unemployment benefit on aggregate employment and
finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 The Environment
Time is continuous, and at any point there exists a unit mass of ex-ante homoge-
neous workers and a mass N of private sector firms who are heterogeneous in their
level of productivity. Workers and firms are risk-neutral and discount the future at
a rate r > 0. Workers can be in one of three broad states: unemployment, paid em-
ployment or self-employment. They leave the labor market at an exogenous Poisson
rate µ which is independent of their labor market state; they are replaced with new
agents who are born into unemployment. Firms are infinitely lived[2].
Paid employment comes from two sources, large private sector firms and self-
employed individuals. Job offers arrive to unemployed agents from firms at a rate λ0
and paid employees in large firms at a rate λ1 = κλ0. κ is the relative search intensity
of an employed worker compared to an unemployed one. Wages are drawn from a
known distribution F (·). Job offers can also arrive from self-employed recruiters at
a rate λs0 to the unemployed. For tractability, it is assumed that the recruiters direct
all their search intensity to the unemployed, attempts will be made to justify said
assumption in Section 3. These wages are drawn from a known distribution F s(·).
All job offer arrival rates and wage offer distributions are endogenous objects. A
match is destroyed at a Poisson rate δ. Both firm and worker continue to exist, but,
the worker is reallocated to unemployment. If the worker exits the labor market,
at a rate µ, the firm will continue to exist, but with one less worker. Agents are
also exposed to the possibility of having an innovative idea. The rate agents get
ideas follows a Poisson process which is dependent on one’s labor market state.
Ideas arrive to unemployed agents at a rate η0 and to paid employees in large firms
at a rate η1. The quality (productivity) of the idea is drawn from an exogenous
distribution Γ(·). Depending on the draw this will allow workers to cross the market
from unemployment or paid employment and become self-employed. The reservation
productivity of paid employees will depend on their current wage.
Self-employment spells begin as an agent working on his own producing output
according to the draw from Γ(·). There is a search friction in the matching process:
hiring workers takes time. One can think of this as time required for vetting, pre-
liminary training etc. So, as will transpire, some of the self-employed will wish to
hire but are time restricted and therefore hire at a suboptimal rate.
It is assumed that the self-employed hire at a Poisson rate h`, where h is exogenous
and constant for all firms (independent of size and productivity) and ` is the size of
the firm, and can take any positive integer value. Thus, by construction, the growth
[2]Firms are assumed to be infinitely lived to keep features of the Bontemps et al (2000) model.
Haltiwanger et al (2013) finds for larger firms in the U.S. - those with more than 500 employees,
there is less than a 1% chance that a firm will go out of business in a given year. Implying that
large firms exist on average for longer than 100 years. Considerably longer than a typical agent’s
tenure in the labor market.
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of a firm adheres to Gibrat’s law [3]. The rate of total hiring is proportional to the
firm size as the hiring process requires a certain amount of work. Larger firms can
share this workload over a greater number of workers and hence the rate of hiring
increases proportionally with the size. In a way akin to Coles and Mortensen (2011),
the size of the firm ` will follow an endogenously determined Markov process.
Finally, the model is derived in a steady-state. The stocks of agents in each of the
three states are constant over time as are the distributions of firm size, productivity
amongst the self-employed and the distribution of wages amongst the paid employ-
ees. To solve the model one needs to: (i) derive the value functions of the three
states; (ii) derive reservation levels for which workers change states; (iii) calculate
the size of each state and derive the ergodic distributions of wages and productivity
within states; (iv) derive the profit maximizing wage policy of large private sector
firms.
2.2 Value Functions
Workers can be in one of five states: paid employment in a large firm; unemploy-
ment; paid employment, employed by a self-employed recruiter; own account self-
employment (working alone); and recruiting self-employment (hiring paid employ-
ees). In all states workers are maximizing their lifetime income discounted at a rate
r. The following subsections derive the lifetime values for each state.
2.2.1 Paid Employees
A paid employee working for a large firm has two sources of revenue flow from em-
ployment, a basic wage and a nonpecuniary amenity, which ex-ante can be positive
or negative; it is measured relative to being a self-employed worker. As well as the
revenue flow of income and amenity, the value function of a paid employee has the
option value of transiting into other states, namely the option value of unemploy-
ment, higher value paid employment (employed by firm or a self-employed agent)
and self-employment. At any point there is a possibility that the agent exits the
labor force. All future revenue flows are discounted at a rate r.
The value function for a paid employee earning a wage w in a large firm is given
by[4]
(r + µ)W (w) = w + a+ δ [U −W (w)] + λ1EF max [W (x)−W (w), 0]
+ η1EΓ max [S(z)−W (w), 0] . (1)
An individual exits to unemployment at a rate δ when the match dissolves. They
receive other job offers from firms at a rate λ1 and they have innovative ideas at a
rate η1. After an idea a private sector employee either stays employed or becomes
self-employed which gives value S(z), where z is the productivity draw. If the idea
is sufficiently good, they leave to self-employment, and initially, work individually,
[3]The empirical evidence on Gibrat’s law in relation to firm growth is mixed. For a summary of
the literature see Santarelli et al (2006).
[4]EF max [W (x)−W (w), 0] =
∫
max [W (x)−W (w), 0] dF (x) and EΓ max [S(z)−W (w), 0] =∫
max [S(z)−W (w), 0] dΓ(z).
Bradley Page 6 of 32
as an own account worker. The value for unemployment is given by equation (2),
where b is the flow value of unemployment, relative to self-employment.
(r + µ)U = b+ λ0EF max [W (x)− U, 0] + η0EΓ max [S(z)− U, 0]
+ λs0EF s max [W s(x)− U, 0] (2)
If a paid employee is hired by a self-employed agent, they face very different
opportunities than if they are employed by a large firm. The validity of these as-
sumptions will be addressed when looking at the data in Section 3. Firstly, as the
firm is relatively small it is assumed that the actions of the workers are observable
to the self-employed recruiter. Thus the worker spends no time searching for other
jobs or thinking about innovative ideas. Therefore in addition to exiting the labor
market, the only other potential transition facing the employee is to unemployment.
This occurs more frequently than in paid employment in a large private sector firm
because not only does the worker contend with the possibility the match is de-
stroyed, at rate δ, but the recruiter employing him can also exit the labor market,
at a rate µ. Like a paid employee in a large firm, the amenity associated with paid
employment in a self-employed owned firm is given by the flow benefit a. The value
function for a paid employee earning w working for a self-employed recruiter is:
(r + µ)W s(w) = w + a+ (µ+ δ) [U −W s(w)] (3)
2.2.2 The Self-Employed
All self-employed agents start their self-employment spell as an own account worker.
That is they employ only themselves. If an agent aims to recruit workers they will
arrive at a rate h`, where ` is the integer number of employees they already have.
Workers will quit the firm at a rate (µ + δ), exiting to either unemployment or
out of the labor force. Thus the number of workers a recruiter employs will follow a
Markov process. The only search friction that exists for a recruiter is that hiring is a
time consuming process. For a firm with an integer number of employees `, it takes
an estimated time 1/h` to hire a worker. Unlike the Burdett and Mortensen (1998)
model, a higher wage neither increases the rate of recruitment nor retention. For
ease of exposition it is assumed that the self-employed never exit self-employment
for unemployment.
To begin with, attention is restricted to those self-employed whose interest it is to
recruit workers. Then at the start of a self-employment spell an agent produces as
an own account worker, his output is equal to his productivity and at a rate h will
hire a worker. The value function for a newly self-employed agent of productivity
y who intends to recruit is given in equation (4), where R(y, 1) is the value of a
self-employed individual with productivity y and one employee.
(r + µ)SR(y) = y + h [R(y, 1)− SR(y)] (4)
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If a self-employed agent does find a worker, he foregoes his own output in order
to manage the newly created firm. However, the production per worker is now p(y),
where p(y) is the productivity per worker of a self-employed owned firm of quality y.
Any worker employed produces output using the self-employed agent’s technology,
p(y), and receives an endogenously determined wage, w?(y, `). Some regularity con-
ditions are imposed on p(y), they are, that p′(y) > 0 for all y and p′′(y) ≥ 0 for all y.
Intuitively one might expect p(y) > y, as the firm has management oversight, how-
ever a priori only the two regularity assumptions are assumed. The value function
for a recruiter is given by R(y, `), where y is the productivity and ` is the integer
number of workers employed. The right hand side of equation (5) contains: the profit
flow, production net of wages; plus the probability of expanding employment by one
employee multiplied by the option value of that occurrence; plus the equivalent for
losing one worker, either the worker returns to unemployment or leaves the labor
force entirely. Equation (5) is expressed for one worker and an arbitrary amount of
workers `.
(r + µ)R(y, 1) = p(y)−w?(y, 1) + h [R(y, 2)−R(y, 1)]
+ (µ+ δ) [R(y, 0)−R(y, 1)]
...
(r + µ)R(y, `) = (p(y)−w?(y, `))`+ h` [R(y, `+ 1)−R(y, `)]
+ (µ+ δ) ` [R(y, `− 1)−R(y, `)] (5)
The recruiter sets w?(y, `) to maximize his present discounted value. Since posting
vacancies and hiring are costless (other than time) there is no incentive to pay higher
wages to attract workers. In addition, the recruiter does not need to pay a higher
wage to retain his workers, as there is no retention motive. He observes them not
looking for other jobs or innovative ideas. He cannot, however, pay them nothing;
he must pay a sufficiently high wage such that some workers want to be employed.
The recruiter exclusively hires from the pool of unemployed therefore the wage paid
makes workers indifferent between remaining unemployed and accepting an offer.
That is W s(w?(y, `)) ≥ U ; a worker must be at least as well off in paid employment
than they are in unemployment. The recruiter’s problem is:
max
w?(y,`)
R(y, `) subject to W s(w?(y, `)) ≥ U (6)
Since the value of recruitment decreases with the wage rate, the optimal wage is
independent of y and ` and solves the equality W s(w?) = U . An explicit solution
will be given for w? in the next section.
Further, it is assumed that if a recruiter has just one employee, if that employee
leaves the firm, the firm and the self-employed individual cease to exist (retires)
then R(y, 0) = 0. This assumption is made purely for tractability reasons, as given
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this, the difference equations specified in equation (5) are linear in `. With this in
mind, it is trivial to see that
R(y, `) = `R(y, 1). (7)
Thus equation (5) simplifies to
R(y, 1) =
p(y)− w?
r + 2µ+ δ − h. (8)
Substituting equation (5) into equation (4), one can obtain the recursive solution
for the value of becoming self-employed and intending to recruit with productivity
y
SR(y) =
y(r + 2µ+ δ) + h(p(y)− y))− hw?
(r + 2µ+ δ − h)(r + µ+ h) . (9)
However, it is not clear whether it is in the interest of the self-employed to hire
any paid employees. They have to forfeit their own production and increase their
chance of going under. Looking at equation (9), as the wage they pay their employees
increases, the value of self-employment with the intention to recruit decreases. The
value function of a self-employed individual of productivity y to remain an own
account worker will be just their output, which they get indefinitely (unless they
exit the labor market).
(r + µ)SO(y) = y (10)
For an individual not to set about recruiting, the option value of having one
worker must be negative. A self-employed individual with productivity y will aim
to recruit workers if SR(y) ≥ SO(y). Given certain regularity conditions, to follow,
there exists a threshold productivity level ψ1, above which self-employed agents
intend to recruit.
So the value function for a newly self-employed agent is given by equation (11).
For y ∈ [ψ0, ψ1) an agent will make no attempt at hiring and their value function is
simply the present discounted value of constant production of amount y. If y ≥ ψ1,
they will initially be an own account worker, but will hire someone with Poisson rate
h and produce an amount p(y), paying w? to their employee. Thus the expression
is increasing in h and in p(y) and decreasing in w?. It is also decreasing in r, µ and
δ, the discount rate and the Poisson rates of agents leaving the labor market and
job destruction, respectively.
S(y) =
{
y
r+µ if y < ψ1
y(r+2µ+δ)+h(p(y)−y))−hw?
(r+2µ+δ−h)(r+µ+h) if y ≥ ψ1
(11)
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2.3 Reservation Strategies
A worker’s strategy can be characterized by a set of reservation values which de-
pends on his current labor market state.
The wage a paid employee receives in a large firm that makes him indifferent be-
tween becoming self-employed of productivity y and remaining in paid employment
is defined as φ(y). Similarly the productivity a paid employee will require to enter
self-employment is ψ(w). These functions solve the equalities:
S(ψ(w)) = W (w) S(y) = W (φ(y)) (12)
Using the above two equations:
S(y) = W (φ(y)) = S(ψ(φ(y))) (13)
Thus,
y = ψ(φ(y)) (14)
Hence, given monotonicity of the value functions, ψ and φ are reciprocals of one
another. Similarly, the wage that makes an unemployed agent indifferent between
continuing unemployment and being employed by a large firm is φ0 and solves the
equality W (φ0) = U , and the productivity of an idea that makes an unemployed
agent indifferent between continuing unemployment and being self-employed at that
productivity is ψ0 and solves the equality S(ψ0) = U . Clearly, ψ(φ0) = ψ0.
To find solutions for these reservation strategies, it is convenient to begin by
simplifying the value functions for workers: Firstly, W s(w) = W s, as F s(·) is a
degenerate distribution at w?. Since W s = U , a worker never gets a positive option
value from being employed by a self-employed recruiter, therefore it drops out of
the Bellman equations. Finally, in calculating the expectation, one can integrate by
parts, where the overscore on the distribution represents the survival function, for
example, F (·) = 1−F (·). Thus equations (1), (2) and (3) simplify to (15), (16) and
(17), respectively.
(r + µ)W (w) = w + a+ δ [U −W (w)] + λ1
∫
w
[
W ′(x)F (x)
]
dx
+ η1
∫
ψ(w)
[
S′(z)Γ(z)
]
dz (15)
(r + µ)U = b+ λ0
∫
φ0
[
W ′(x)F (x)
]
dx+ η0
∫
ψ0
[
S′(z)Γ(z)
]
dz (16)
W s =
w? + a
r + µ
(17)
Solutions for ψ0, φ0 and an ODE defining φ(y) are provided in Appendix A.1.
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2.4 Steady State
The model is derived in a steady state. A steady state is defined as a constant share
of agents in each labor market state, and the distributions of wages amongst the
paid employees, the productivity amongst the self-employed and the distribution of
employment size amongst recruiters are all stationary.
The steady state is defined by equations (18) through (21). The sum of all agents
in the economy is equal to unity. The flow into unemployment equals the outflow.
The flow out of self-employment (paid employment) below a productivity y (wage w)
is equal to the flow into self-employment (paid employment) below a productivity y
(wage w). As well as this, the distribution of labor force size amongst self-employed
recruiters that is dictated by a Markov process has reached its ergodic distribution.
This last object is denoted as Σ(`); it is the measure of recruiters and those who
intend to recruit hiring an integer ` workers.
An agent can be in one of three broad states and the sum of agents is equal to
unity: they can be unemployed, in paid employment (by a large firm or a self-
employed recruiter) or in self-employment. One could also differentiate further,
defining those self-employed, recruiting or with the intention to recruit and those
who are own account workers.
Nu + (N
f
e +N
s
e ) +Ns = 1 (18)
The flow out of unemployment, the left hand side of equation (19) is made up of
four flows. In the order they are expressed they are: those leaving to paid employ-
ment in large firms; those leaving to be self-employed; those exiting the labor force;
and those becoming employed by small self-employed recruiters. This last flow is
equal to hNse + hΣ(0). The rate at which the self-employed hire is equal to h mul-
tiplied by the total number of agents engaged in hiring, that is all the employees
(Nse ) plus the recruiters who are yet to hire any workers (Σ(0)). The flow exclusively
comes out of unemployment as anyone in paid employment (by large firms) would
reject any offer. The flow into unemployment is comprised of all the new entrants
into the labor market plus the paid employees whose employers have exited the
labor market. New entrants arrive at a rate that exceeds µ. Firms of size one have a
double coincidence of exiting the labor market, as discussed earlier. They also leave
the labor market if they lose their final worker.
Nu
(
λ0 + η0Γ(ψ0) + µ
)
+h(Nse +Σ(0)) = µ+(µ+δ)Σ(1)+(µ+δ)N
s
e +δN
f
e (19)
Equation (20) equalizes the flow in and out of self-employment below a produc-
tivity level y. Γ(·) is the primitive distribution from which agents draw the pro-
ductivity of their ideas from and Γs(·) is the distribution of productivity amongst
the self-employed, an endogenous object. The inflow into self-employment, the right
hand side of equation (20), comes from those from unemployment and those in paid
employment (by large firms). If the latter are earning a wage w they must get an
innovative idea of greater than productivity ψ(w). The self-employed only exit their
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state to being out of the labor force. This exit rate increases once they start recruit-
ing. Hence the equation is split either side of y = ψ1. If they have one employee
they will cease to exist if that one employee exits the labor force. The proportion
of self-employed recruiters with exactly one employee is given by Σ(1)
NsΓs(ψ1)
.
For y < ψ1:
NsΓs(y)µ = Nuη0 [Γ(y)− Γ(ψ0)] +Nfe η1
∫ φ(y)
φ0
[Γ(y)− Γ(ψ(x))] dG(x)
and for y ≥ ψ1:
NsΓs(y)µ+Ns (Γs(y)− Γs(ψ1)) (µ+ δ)Σ(1)
NsΓs(ψ1)
= Nuη0 [Γ(y)− Γ(ψ0)]
+Nfe η1
∫ φ(y)
φ0
[Γ(y)− Γ(ψ(x))] dG(x) (20)
For those in paid employment in large firms below a wage φ(y), agents exit paid
employment to unemployment at a rate δ, they exit the labor force entirely at a rate
µ. They find higher paid jobs in large firms at a rate λ1F (φ(y)). Paid employees
can also exit to self-employment; they get an innovative idea at a rate η1 and will
act on it depending on their current wage and the quality of the draw they get from
Γ(·). The inflow is entirely from unemployment.
Nfe G(φ(y))(µ+ δ + λ1F (φ(y))) +N
f
e η1
∫ y
ψ0
Γ(z)dG(φ(z))
= Nuλ0F (φ(y)) (21)
Equations (18), (19), (20) and (21) are solved simultaneously for the endogenous
objects (Nse , Nu, N
f
e G(φ(y)), NsΓs(y)). These coupled with the distribution Σ(`)
define the steady state allocation of agents. The solution for these objects is provided
in Appendix A.2.
2.5 Private Sector Firms
Private sector firms are large and infinitely lived. The law of large numbers is em-
ployed and they are modeled following Bontemps et al (2000). This paper considers
the familiar equilibrium where firms post wages and commit to those wages for
their lifetime. The higher the wage a firm posts, the larger the firm (fewer quits
and more hires); this is at the cost of making less profit per worker. As pointed out
by Coles (2001) this is not a dynamically consistent wage posting strategy without
commitment on wages. To see this, imagine a firm has grown to its steady state
size. Rather than posting its optimal wage w, it will be strictly better off to pay its
workers’ reservation wage φ0. Over a period dt → 0 no workers will quit and the
firm will make strictly greater profits. Coles (2001) identifies a dynamically consis-
tent equilibrium without relying on commitment. Interestingly, the wages posted
by self-employed recruiters are a dynamically consistent strategy, without having
to rely on commitment. It is the belief of the author that despite theoretical issues
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regarding dynamic consistency, the tractability of Bontemps et al (2000) makes it
very well suited to modeling the behavior of large firms.
There exists a continuum of infinitely lived private sector firms of mass N who
are profit maximizers and heterogeneous in their level of productivity, y, where
y ∼ Γf (·). Each firm has the same exposure in the labor market and all receive a
mass of contacts at an exogenous Poisson rate hf . Unlike self-employed recruiters,
it is assumed that large private sector firms are in some way detached from the
labor market and cannot target a specific subgroup of job seekers. Thus not every
contact is associated with a hire. The steady state size of a firm posting a wage w
is therefore a function of the proportion of contacts it makes that accept the offer,
a(w), and the number who are in employment and quit ∆(w).
a(w) =
λ0Nu + λ1N
f
e G(w)
λ0Nu + λ1Ne
∆(w) =µ+ δ + λ1F (w)
The size of a firm posting a wage w, is given by `f (w) and solves the flow balance
equation:
`f (w) ∆(w) = h
fa(w) (22)
By setting a wage w, a firm of productivity y will be of size `f (w) and thus have
total profit given by:
max
w≥φ0
pi (w; y) = (y − w) h
fa(w)
∆(w)
(23)
The firm’s problem is solved by the first order condition:
y − w = a(w)∆(w)
a′(w)∆(w)− a(w)∆′(w) (24)
Thus if wages are increasing in productivity, then one can infer that F (w) =
Γf (y (w)), where the relationship y (w) is given by (24) and Γf (·) is the cumulative
distribution of productivity amongst large private sector firms. Thus the distribu-
tion of wage offers in the private sector, F (w) can be retrieved if we know the
distribution of productivity across firms.
To close the model, labor demand is fully endogenized. The total number of con-
tacts from firms that workers receive is given by:
M = λ0Nu + λ1N
f
e
The total jobs offered by firms is the product of the mass of firms and the number
of contacts made per firm, Nhf . Recall, there is some additional friction (if κ < 1) in
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looking for a job while employed by a large firm, relative to being in unemployment,
λ1 = κλ0. The arrival rate of job offers from private sector firms to unemployed
agents is then given by:
λ0 =
Nhf
Nu + κN
f
e
(25)
2.6 Equilibrium Characterization
Given exogenous parameters r, a, b, µ, δ, η0, η1, h, p(y), κ,Γ(·),Γf (·), N, hf : an equi-
librium is characterized by the following conditions: (i) agents behave optimally
in their career decisions, solutions to φ0, ψ0, ψ1 and φ(y); (ii) the economy is in
steady-state, the inflow from a given state equals the outflow, solutions to Γs(·),
G(·), Nu, Nfe , Nse , Ns and Σ(`); (iii) large private sector firms and self-employed
recruiters offer their workers’ wages optimally, w(p) and w? and (iv) when firms
behavior is aggregated the wage offer distribution F (·) and the offer arrival rates
λ0, λ
s
0 and λ1 are determined. Attention is restricted to a specific class of equilibria
where self-employed individuals exist, some of whom recruit paid employees. To
guarantee this equilibrium, the exogenous parameter space needs to be constrained.
Assumption 1 h ∈ (0, r + 2µ+ δ)
Assumption 2 Either p′(y) ≥ 0 and p′′(y) > 0 or p′(y) > r+2µ+δ−hr+µ and p′′(y) ≥ 0.
Proposition Given Assumptions 1 and 2, an equilibrium will exist with self-
employed recruiters.
The intuition is as follows, these assumptions are needed for two reasons. Firstly,
Assumption 1 guarantees the non negativity of the value function of a recruiter,
see (8). Given this, Assumption 2 guarantees that for a sufficiently good idea a
self-employed agent will actively seek to hire workers.
Proof: For an individual to consider self-employment as a viable option it must
yield a positive value. A recruiter with one employee has value given by equation
(8). Clearly, he must make positive profit per worker (p(y) > w?)
R(y, 1) =
p(y)− w?
r + 2µ+ δ − h
The above is positive if Assumption 1 holds. Recruiters will exist if, for some y,
the value of intending to recruit, SR(y), is greater than being an own-account self-
employed indefinitely, SO(y). SO(y) is a linear function of y and SR(y) is a linear
function of p(y). If p′(y) ≥ 0 and p′′(y) > 0, the first part of Assumption 2. Clearly,
for sufficiently large y, SR(y) > SO(y) and given Assumption 1, recruiters will exist
in equilibrium.
If p(y) is linear and increasing in y, the second part of Assumption 2. Then both
SO(y) and SR(y) are linear and increasing in y. Thus for sufficienlty large y, recruiter
will exist if S′R(y) > S
′
O(y). This is the case, given p
′(y) > r+2µ+δ−hr+µ , contained in
Assumption 2. Q.E.D.
Identification Result: A sufficient condition for the existence of recruiters is
p′(y) > r+2µ+δr+µ
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For given p(y), r, δ and µ, one can guarantee the existence of recruiters (given
Assumption 1 holds) if:
p′(y) > max
0<h<r+2µ+δ
(
r + 2µ+ δ − h
r + µ
)
p′(y) >
r + 2µ+ δ
r + µ
Class of Equilibrium: the equilibrium is restricted to one where self-employed
recruiters exist. Clearly, some self-employed will be own account workers. These
can fall into two categories either they are own account workers, but because of the
frictions present in the market, as yet, they have been unable to hire anyone. Or,
they are own account workers with no intention to recruit. For the latter type of
agent to exist it is required that S0(y) > SR(y) for some y and because S
′
R(y) >
S′O(y) for all y, this is equivalent to SO(ψ0) > SR(ψ0).
Since, one cannot restrict attention to either class as neither can be invalidated by
data any simulation of the model needs to repeatedly check in what equilibrium it is
in. One where, all self-employed intend to recruit or one where some self-employed
intend to stay own account indefinitely.
3 Data
The model described is estimated using the British Household Panel Survey
(BHPS). It is identified using transition rates across labor market states, the earn-
ings of paid employees and self-employed workers and the distribution of firm size.
Exogenous parameters are estimated by simulated method of moments. The prin-
ciple of the estimation technique is to find values of the structural parameters that
minimize a function of the difference between a chosen set of moments from the
data and data simulated with these values of the structural parameters.
Of the exogenous parameters, the only one that is not estimated is the discount
rate r. r is calibrated as equal to 0.0043, which is the monthly (continuous time)
equivalent of a 5% annual rate. In order to estimate the distribution from which the
self-employed draw their level of productivity, a parametric assumption is made. It
is assumed that Γ(·) follows a log-normal distribution with the mean and standard
deviation of the associated normal given by my and sy and the production function
of self-employed recruiters is specified as p(y) = βy. Thus, the rest of this section
concerns itself with the estimation of the vector of exogenous parameters θ:
θ =
(
h, η0, η1, µ, β,my, sy, a, b, κ,Γ
f (·), hf , N) (26)
The role of the rest of the data section are twofold. Firstly, it aims to inform the
reader about the data that is used to estimate the model. Secondly, it attempts to
find empirical support for predictions of the model as well as assumptions made for
tractability.
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3.1 The Sample
The data used in the analysis are taken from the BHPS, a longitudinal dataset of
British households. Data were first collected in 1991, but attention is restricted to
five waves covering the period from 2004 to 2008. The sample comprises of prime-
age (21-60) white male low-skilled workers. Low-skilled is defined as not having
obtained A-level qualifications. These are the highest qualifications available for
students aged 18 in the UK, before they enter higher education. A worker is an
individual who is never inactive in the period looked at: if out of work, they declare
themselves to be actively seeking work. The hourly earnings distribution is adjusted
by treating the bottom and top 2.5% of the distribution as missing, hopefully ridding
the sample of erroneously reported earnings.
Data are homogenized to include only low-skilled workers as agents are ex-ante
homogeneous so its important they are of similar skill in the data. Implicitly, it has
been assumed that agents are exposed to employment opportunities at the same
rate within a labor market state. This seems less of an imposition on the data for
low-skilled workers, as many high skilled professions exist where agents become self-
employed more frequently. In addition, the type of self-employment more prevalent
amongst high-skill workers, being made a partner of a firm for example, is less in
keeping with the arrival of an innovative idea, as modeled in this setup. Information
on cross-sector differences in employment, hours worked and earnings are reported
in Table 1. Following the methodology of Hurst et al (2014), using British con-
sumption data, the earnings of the self-employed are adjusted to take into account
any misreporting of earnings. This exercise is explained in detail in Appendix A.3.
The adjustment is relative to paid employment, one interpretation is therefore how
much the self-employed under/over state their income relative to paid employees.
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
There are a number of points worth noting from Table 1. There is a non-negligible
share of recruiters, consistent with the findings of Moralee (1998), with approxi-
mately one third of self-employed agents hiring paid employees. The self-employed
work longer hours than their paid employee counterparts and the recruiting self-
employed work significantly more still. There is a clear ordering in the second mo-
ment of the earnings distribution across the three labor market states irrespective of
whether one looks at the raw or the adjusted data. The ordering of the first moment
is ambiguous however; the preferred specification that will be used in estimation
is the adjusted data. Looking at the large implied differences, the importance of
correcting for the misreporting of earnings is evident. The ranking of the second
moment of the earnings distribution is not targeted in the estimation, but will still
be replicated by the theoretical model.
Table 2 shows monthly worker turnover observed in the data. For the most part,
the cells of Table 2 are self-explanatory. The diagonal elements are all unobservable
with the exception of workers changing jobs within paid employment. Although it
is possible that a business goes bust and one instantly starts up a new one, this
phenomenon is not possible to observe using the BHPS so transitions within specific
self-employment states are not reported. A paid employee in a small firm is anyone
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who declared their establishment to have fewer than 25 people working in it. Small
and large firms are differentiated between because very few recruiters have 25 or
more employees, see Table 4. Therefore, the large firms provide a better indication
of mobility for the paid employees hired by large private sector firms.
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
The rates in bold are those that the model is capable of replicating, some of which
the estimator will target, and those in plain text are ones that the model is unable
to generate. The model is unable to generate a number of classes of transitions.
One is any transition into self-employment where the worker instantly becomes a
recruiter. This is inconsistent with a labor market with search frictions, as one
cannot hire individuals instantaneously. The second is a simplifying assumption
made for tractability: once in self-employment an individual is allowed little labor
market mobility. Of the transitional moments omitted, the rate at which a recruiter
transits to being an own account worker is the most glaring. In a given month there
is a 1% chance of a recruiter losing its workforce and becoming an own account
worker. This model is not able to generate this, in order to keep the result that a
recruiter’s value is proportional to the number of employees it has (equation (7)),
which helps the tractability of the model. Also, while 1% seems large, in fact, from
Table 1 just 4.6% of employed individuals are recruiters so this translates into very
few transitions missed. Finally, as in models of wage posting, firm heterogeneity
and on the job search like Bontemps et al (2000) , there is a one-to-one relation
between firm size and offered wage. In an identical way, this model can therefore
not rationalize why a paid employee would take a wage cut and move to a smaller
firm.
The parameter h is identified using the transition rate from own account self-
employed to becoming a recruiter. Since the employee size distribution of self-
employed recruiters is governed by µ, δ and h, this could be an alternative source
of identification, conditional on µ and δ. The firm size distribution amongst private
sector employers is used to identify hf , the volume of vacancies a single firm posts.
The self-employed are asked how many people they employ; the paid employees are
asked how many other people are in their place of work. These numbers are grouped
into size bins and from these it is difficult to infer the size distribution of private
sector firms. Therefore, purely for comparison, data on firm size from the Office of
National Statistics (ONS) in the midpoint of the sample period is used.
The downside of comparing the size distributions in Tables 3 and 4 is that the
size bins do not correspond to one another. The cumulative firm size distribution
at employee sizes 9, 49, 99, 499 and 999 can be compared. Firms owned by the
self-employed are typically smaller than firms at large, 86.1% of self-employed run
firms have less than 10 employees, compared with 82.02% of all firms. Similarly,
96.69% of all self-employed owned firms have fewer than 50 employees compared
with 96.4% of all firms. However, at some point between 49 and 99 employees, the
two cumulative distributions intersect, with fewer than 100, 500 and 1000 employ-
ees in all firms (self-employed firms) account for 98.41% (96.69%), 99.84% (98.01%)
and 99.96% (98.68%), respectively. The greater proportion of self-employed in the
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upper tail could be associated with a small sample bias that will over-represent the
tails of the distribution. For example, if one were to omit the three highest reported
firm sizes amongst the self-employed then there would be first order stochastic
domination of the distribution of the size of all firms over those self-employed. It is
also further evidence of insufficient data that there is an observed hole in the size
distribution, between 50 and 99 workers. To my knowledge, there is no paper that
looks at this relationship in close detail. To do so adequately, one would require a
more comprehensive dataset.
INSERT TABLES 3 AND 4 HERE
Finally, it is worth examining the restrictions imposed on those paid employees
hired by self-employed recruiters. It is not sufficient to just look at the mobility
patterns of the paid employees in small firms, as perhaps, they are also overwhelm-
ingly hired by private firms. Instead to examine the mobility of these workers we
use variation in self-employment rates across industry classification[5]. Using simple
weighted least squared regressions, the aim is to examine whether paid employees
hired by the self-employed are less or more likely to find alternative employment and
consequently earn less or more. The dependent variables in the two regressions are
the rate of job mobility in one digit industry classification to any employment state
but unemployment and the average log wage of paid employees in one digit industry
classification. In each case the explanatory variable is the proportion of employed
individuals in a one digit industry who self identify as recruiting self-employed. The
logic for this is if you are a paid employee in a recruiting self-employed intensive
industry you are more likely to be hired by a self-employed agent than in an indus-
try with relatively few recruiting self-employed. The coefficients are given in Table
5 below, with associated standard errors in the parenthesis.
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE
All parameters are statistically significant to any conventional significance level.
When the explanatory variable equals zero, that implies there are no self-employed
recruiters in that one digit industry classification. If the explanatory variable equals
one it means all employed individuals in that industry are self-employed recruiters.
If one interprets the former as an instance where the probability a paid employee is
hired by a self-employed recruiter is zero and in the latter the probability equals one,
the coefficients have a straightforward interpretation. Simply, they are the difference
in mobility and earnings associated with paid employment, given one is hired by
a private sector firm or a self-employed recruiter. With this in mind, the results
are supportive of the restrictions imposed on model. Using the parameter estimates
from the mobility regression, a linear projection would imply that a paid employee
would have zero chance, assuming non-negative probability, of exiting his current
job for any other employment state but unemployment. The earnings regression
[5]Industry classification are based on “The Standard Industrial Classification of economic
activities 1992”. They can be found by visiting url: http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-
method/classifications/archived-standard-classifications/uk-standard-industrial-classification-
1992–sic92-/index.html
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suggests that a paid employee hired by a self-employed recruiter will on average
earn 84% less than one hired by a large private sector firm. This paper does not
aim to suggest that these restrictions are true, rather they are not too important
and seem to be borne out by the data.
4 Estimation
4.1 The Estimation Protocol
The model is estimated using a simulated generalized method of moments esti-
mator (SGMM). The estimation is performed over a number of steps. The reason
a multi-stepped estimation is implemented is because it makes clear the source
of identification for the moments. It also aids the estimation in not allowing the
constraints put on the parameter space in Section 2.6 to be violated.
Some endogenous parameters can be computed without solving the model. The
endogenous parameters F (·), ψ0 and φ0 are all fixed according to their empirical
counterparts. F (·) is directly observable as the wage distribution for those who
have transited into paid employment straight from unemployment. Note, strictly
speaking this also includes those hired by the self-employed. To keep these to a
minimum, only those transiting to a sector with less than 10% of employment made
up by recruiters are considered[6]. ψ0 and φ0 are the minimum observed earnings
amongst the own account self-employed and φ0 the infimum of the support of F (·).
The nonpecuniary amenities a and b are treated as free parameters so to equalize
equations (29) and (30) in the Appendix. After all other parameters are estimated,
Γf (·) is computed so F (·) is rationalized according to equation (24).
It proves simpler to also treat λ0 and λ1 as temporary exogenous parameters in the
estimation and uncover the underlying exogenous parameters ex post of estimation.
The total contacts that large private sector firms make is driven by a combination of
the number of firms N and the contact per firm hf . While matching the number of
contacts the relative size of these two objects will be set to best match the aggregate
firm size distribution - including the self-employed recruiters.
Estimation works as follows. In a first step the transition rates are exactly iden-
tified and the following vector of parameters are estimated (δ, h, λ0, λ1, η0, η1, µ).
Conditional on these, and the parameters fixed ex ante the self-employed produc-
tivity parameters are estimated to match the earnings of own account and recruiting
self-employed, they are (β,my, sy). These two steps are continuously iterated on un-
til all parameter estimates are stable. Finally, as discussed in a final step after the
parameters have converged, endogenous parameters are rationalized by their exoge-
nous primitives and the aggregate firm size distribution is fitted with its empirical
counterpart. Each step is described in more detail below.
4.1.1 Stage 1: transition parameters
In this stage the remaining transition rates, reported in Appendix A.4, are matched.
They are the monthly rate at which individuals transit from: paid employment in
a firm of any size to unemployment; unemployment to paid employment; unem-
ployment to becoming an own account worker; paid employment to another paid
[6]This corresponds to omitting those who gained employment in sectors with one digit indus-
try code zero, six or eight. That is those employed in: agriculture, forestry and fishing; finance,
insurance and real estate; and certain services.
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employer; paid employment to becoming an own account worker; and from an own
account self-employed worker to a recruiter.
These moment conditions are reported in Appendix A.4 and are exactly identified
by the parameters (δ, h, λ0, λ1, η0, η1, µ), λ0 and λ1 are endogenous to the model and
are rationalized in Section 4.1.3.
4.1.2 Stage 2: self-employed earnings
The distribution of earnings amongst own account workers is given by the solu-
tion to the set of steady state equations in Section 2.4. The earnings distribution
and productivity distribution are equivalent as own account workers earn their out-
put. Earnings for recruiters differ by their level of productivity and their size. The
distribution of profits are calculated by summing over the measure at each size dis-
tribution, Σ(`). Deciles from the data are matched with deciles from the simulated
model using the mean and variance of log productivity, my and sy as well as the
parameter β which describes the increased profitability associated with hiring. The
deciles of the two earnings distributions are fitted using an equally weighted matrix,
following the criterion in Altonji and Segal (1996). The authors show that when mo-
ment conditions are based on relatively few observations an equally weighted matrix
often performs better than an optimally weighted one.
After the exactly-identified first stage has fitted the transition rates, conditional
on these estimates the over-identified second stage fits the earnings of own account
workers and recruiters according to my, sy and β. These parameters are updated
and Stage one is repeated, this is done until all the estimated parameters have
converged. It is found that this multi-stepped procedure performs better in fitting
the data than a single-step protocol.
4.1.3 Stage 3: ex post calculations
κ, the degree to which paid employees are exposed to private sector firms relative
to the unemployed is given by κ = λ1λ0 . The endogenous parameters λ0 and λ1 are
estimated in Section 4.1.1.
The distribution of productivity amongst large private sector firms is identified
non-parametrically. Equation (24) is computed so the productivity of a firm pay-
ing w is known and given by the relation y(w). Then since this is an increasing
function (verified by repeated simulation) F (w) = Γf (y(w)), where F (w) is non-
parametrically estimated before the first step.
Paid employees are asked the size of their employer, put into the same size bins as
Table 4. The firm size distribution of self-employed owned firms depends on µ and
h and has already been determined. In order to fit the number of workers in firms
of certain size or less the model is only able to adjust the firm size distribution of
large private sector firms, who are responsible for the majority of paid employment.
This distribution `f (w) is given by equation (22). The only parameter that is left
undetermined is hf , the number of contacts each firm makes. The distribution of
firm size employing paid employees’ is matched by minimizing the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov distance between the theoretical and empirically observed distribution.
Thus all that is left to estimate is the measure of firms in the economy N . This is
set to equalize the accounting identity, given by equation (25).
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4.2 Results
Table 6 presents the point estimates of the exogenous parameters in the model,
bootstrapped standard errors are given in the parentheses. Standard errors are
based on 500 resamples of both data sources, taking into account imprecision in the
estimation of how much the self-employed underreport earnings.
The transitional parameters given in the first section of Table 6 are all monthly
Poisson rates. At first glance h seems fairly small, 35% of new own account workers
who aim to recruit will hire someone in their first five years. However, because hires
are made at a rate h`, the frequency of hires increases as the number of employees
grows, 88% (98.5%) of self-employed recruiters with five (ten) workers will hire
another worker in the next five years.
The rate at which individuals receive innovative ideas is also infrequent. If one
spends the majority of their lives in paid employment it is highly likely they will
never have a single idea. The rate at which agents are exposed to ideas is six times
higher when they are unemployed compared to when they are in paid employment.
When an idea does arrive, it is drawn from a log-normal distribution with the mean
and standard deviation of the natural log of productivity as given by my and sy in
Table 6.
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE
Amenities presented in the second panel of Table 6 are measured in pounds per
hour. The value of leisure b is negative and large, meaning for low skilled male
workers there is a large stigma associated with unemployment[7]. The nonpecuniary
amenity associated with self-employment is £6.53 per hour. This is commonly re-
ferred to in the literature as the benefit associated with “being your own boss”.
Comparing this with Table 1 reveals this as 49% (44%) of the adjusted median
wage of own account workers (recruiters).
The parameter κ has a slightly different interpretation as it ordinarily would have.
It is the ratio of job offers that paid employees in large firms receive from other large
firms compared with job offers received by unemployed agents from large firms. Since
the unemployed are also exposed to job offers from self-employed recruiters which
the paid employees are not, the estimate of κ is inflated in comparison with other
canonical models. Estimates of N and hf suggests the mass of private sector firms
is equivalent to approximately 1.4% of the total active members of the labor market
and that in total the firms are in contact with 3.8% of all agents active in the labor
market in a given month.
β is the factor by which production increases when an own account worker begins
to recruit. Recall, when an agent recruits he steps down from production and acts
as a managerial overseer. Since β is given by 1.674 a recruiting self-employed will
make less after hiring their first worker then they were previously. However, losses
are recouped as soon as they hire their second employee.
[7]Interestingly, in a similar multi-sector model, Meghir et al (2015) also estimate a large negative
flow value for low skilled unemployed workers in Sao Paulo, Brazil. Recall that b is treated as a
free parameter to ensure equation (32) is satisfied. Thus one reason the estimate of b is so small is
that the value of self-employment for a given productivity is underestimated because it contains
a large option value of paid employment, as argued by Milla´n (2012).
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4.3 The Fit
To review, moments that were specifically targeted were a selection of transition
rates, information on firm sizes and deciles of the earnings distributions of self-
employed workers.
Since the transition rates were exactly identified the seven rates targeted matched
perfectly. There are other possible transitions, but as discussed, these are the tran-
sition rates the empirical procedure attempts to fit with the empirical moments.
These moments are fitted extremely well, with all identical to four decimal places.
Since this step is exactly identified the quality of the fit is unsurprising. Table 7
reports the fit of the model for deciles of the earnings distribution of own account
workers. The distribution of earnings fits quite well. The minimum, although not in-
cluded, is perfectly matched by construction, as it is ψ0. Table 8 shows the moment
conditions fitted for the earning of recruiters. Again, the fit is fairly good, especially
when one considers that three parameters (my, sy, β) have effectively been used to
fit the eighteen moment conditions listed in Tables 7 and 8.
INSERT TABLES 7,8 AND 9 HERE
Table 9 shows the proportion of workers employed in a firm of given size or less,
as seen empirically and as predicted by the model. Both are a mixture of those
employed in large firms and small self-employed run firms. By the final stage, the
size distribution of small self-employed firms has been determined. The parameter
hf , the number of contacts a large private sector firm makes determines the size
distribution of this class of firm. The fit appears quite poor. This is because, as
discussed, there is only one parameter hf , fitting eight moment conditions. An
alternative specification is to fit the estimated median of the empirical distribution
and this would be fitted perfectly. Fitting the whole distribution is preferred as
the median is not directly observable, neither does it exploit all the information
contained in the data.
5 Counterfactual Policy Simulation
To illustrate the importance of explicitly modeling the self-employed, specifically as
a source of job creation this section looks at the endogenous employment response as
a consequence of a change in unemployment benefit. It turns out, in the simulations,
for small increases in unemployment benefit, aggregate employment increases. But
underlying this aggregate employment shift is a large reallocation of workers: growth
in paid employees in large private sector firms at the expense of small self-employed
owned firms; and a shift in the composition of the self-employed, who are now
operating with better ideas, but are far less likely to take on workers. This result is
in stark contrast to a typical one sector model of the labor market.
In a prototypical single sector model of this kind, the employment response is
straightforward. Unemployment benefit increases the value of unemployment which
in turn means workers need higher wages to leave for paid employment. Thus fewer
firms can afford to employ workers and the unemployment exit rate falls, and with
a constant employment exit rate, unemployment will unambiguously increase. This
mechanism is confused somewhat with the introduction of a second sector, with
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differing transition rates across sector, the unemployment rate is the solution to a
more complicated set of flow equations, and the net effect is ambiguous. The inclu-
sion of the recruiting self-employed confounds the issue yet further, as now there
is a positive employment externality of one sector on another. On the one hand
if more people are unemployed, with the rate of ideas approximately six times as
large in unemployment compared with employment, in aggregate one would expect
more ideas. Thus agents only act on very good ideas and perhaps this leads to more
recruiting self-employed and hence more job creation. Conversely, an increase in un-
employment benefits will make it more expensive for the recruiting self-employed to
hire workers and therefore perhaps fewer workers will be hired and self-employment
will be less desirable.
The exact specification of the policy is to change the value of b. Recall, that the
estimated value of b is negative and can be thought of as the stigma associated with
unemployment net of any existing unemployment benefit. In these simulations, a
series of increases from zero to £3 per hour are considered. To put this in some
context, assuming a 40 hour week, the maximum increase in benefit considered is
equivalent to £120 per week. At the time of writing, a typical over 25 year old
claimant would expect to get £73.10 per week, so the maximum amount considered
represents a fairly large expansion in the degree of generosity. The practicalities of
the simulation are similar to the estimation, with two exceptions. In the estimation
a and b were treated as free parameters, now these are fixed and φ0 and ψ0 are
solved explicitly. Similarly, the wage offer distribution F (·) and the offer arrival
rates (λ0, λ1) are backed out from the productivity distribution of firms and the
parameters governing the number of firms and contact rate per firm (N,hf ).
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE
This section focuses on the endogenous employment outcomes associated with in-
creasing unemployment benefit. These rates are calculated as described in Section
2.4. Inspection of Figure 1 shows that for small increases in unemployment benefit,
total employment will increase. This is driven by an expansion of paid employment
in large private sector employment, panel a, and in self-employment, panel b. For
extremely generous levels of unemployment benefits both these rates begin to de-
cline and this is reflected in the u-shaped unemployment rate, panel c.
The groups hit hardest by the reforms are the recruiting self-employed and their
employees. Panel a of Figure 1 shows a clear disparity between how the two types of
paid employment respond to the reform. As can be seen in panel a of Figure 2 this is
driven by there being far fewer paid employees in small self-employed firms. Workers
from unemployment, in particular, now command a higher wage, as there is a direct
increase in the value of a worker’s outside option. The self-employed recruiters, who
exclusively hire from this pool are disproportionately affected. Therefore despite
having on average better quality ideas, fewer engage in actively hiring workers,
panel b of Figure 2. These effects are large; paid employees hired by self-employed
owned firms constitute just less than 4% of the share of paid employees in the
pre-reform economy. This falls to less than 1.5% after an increase by the equivalent
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of £3 per hour. Similarly, the proportion of the self-employed willing to hire falls
from over 40% to around 10% with the same level of intervention.
INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
The fall in the level of recruiting self-employed means there are more workers to
be hired by large firms, both directly through the lack of recruiters and crucially in-
directly through the lack of paid employees in small self-employed owned firms. This
feedback effect is so large, that for small increases in benefit there is an expansion
in aggregate employment. This is not necessarily the only mechanism that could
generate such a phenomenon, but it highlights that ignoring the self-employed who
constitute such a large part of the aggregate economy may lead to misjudgments in
active labor market policy.
6 Conclusion
This paper builds an equilibrium model of the labor market with frictions in which
agents endogenously locate on either side of the market, as a paid employee, or
a recruiting self-employed individual. The model is able to replicate differential
features of the earnings distributions of agents in different labor market states.
Using British data, the model is estimated and the career options of the self-
employed are critically assessed. Underreporting of earnings is taken into account
as in Hurst et al (2014), as are future employment and earnings profiles and any
nonpecuniary amenity associated with either state. The estimated parameters are
used in a counterfactual policy exercise that examines the effects of an increase in
the generosity of unemployment benefits. Including the self-employed in the model
yields an interesting result, that for low levels of benefit, an increase will be associ-
ated with an expansion in aggregate employment. A prediction that stands in stark
contrast to typical one sector structural models of the labor market.
There has been a recent surge in the literature that incorporates self-employment
into models of the labor market: Narita (2014), Margolis et al (2014) and Milla´n
(2012). As a result there is a deeper understanding of the puzzle outlined by Hamil-
ton (2000), of why agents choose self-employment at all. By distinguishing between
own account workers and recruiters and giving the self-employed the option to de-
velop a firm, this paper goes further still. Improvements to the precision of estimates
could be made from increases to the size of the data. However, finding data with
the necessary information regarding employment spells, earnings and whether an
individual is a recruiter could be a challenge.
Finally, it is worth stating that there are other salient features regarding self-
employment that have been overlooked in this analysis. Amongst others, poignant
factors include: cross employment state heterogeneity of workers; family structure;
and financial constraints. Future research aimed at incorporating ex ante worker
heterogeneity in order to explain the differences in composition between paid em-
ployees and the self-employed could be extremely fruitful. In a meta-analysis of
recent research Parker (2006) (Table 3.3 page 104) suggests overwhelming cross-
country evidence that the self-employed are older, better educated, have more la-
bor market experience and are wealthier than paid employees. Another research
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agenda that the author believes deserves particular focus is to incorporate asset
accumulation into this type of model and examine the impacts of financial con-
straints on self-employment. There is considerable empirical evidence suggesting
that financial constraints play an important role in an individual’s decision to be-
come self-employed, for a UK context, see for example Blanchflower and Oswald
(1998), Cowling and Mitchell (1997) and Black et al (1996). Incorporating these
features into the theoretical model and estimating the model, if possible, with a
larger dataset could prove to be very fruitful future research projects.
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Appendix A: Appendix
A.1 Solving for Reservation Strategies
Before embarking on the reservation solution, first note the derivatives of the value of
paid employment in a large firm and self-employment with respect to their respective
arguments are given by:
W ′(w) =
[
r + µ+ δ + λ1F (w) + η1Γ(ψ(w))
]−1
(27)
S′(y) =
{
(r + µ)
−1
if y < ψ1
(r+2µ+δ+h(p′(y)−1))
(r+2µ+δ−h)(r+µ+h) if y ≥ ψ1
(28)
φ0, ψ0 and w
? are calculated by solving the equalities W (φ0) = U , S(ψ0) = U
and U = W s. They are given by equations (29), (30) and (31), where W ′(·) and
S′(·) are given by equation (27) and (28).
φ0 = (b− a) + (λ0−λ1)
∫
φ0
[
W ′(x)F (x)
]
dx+ (η0− η1)
∫
ψ0
[
S′(z)Γ(z)
]
dz (29)
Assuming self-employed agents with no intention to recruit exist. Then ψ0 is given
by the solution to the equality SO(ψ0) = U . The value of y that solves this equality
is labelled ψ˜0.
ψ˜0 = b+ λ0
∫
φ0
[
W ′(x)F (x)
]
dx+ η0
∫
ψ0
[
S′(z)Γ(z)
]
dz (30)
As discussed, w? is solved for as the solution to W s = U . Looking at equations
(16), (17) and (30), it is clear that w? can be expressed as in equation (31).
w? = ψ˜0 − a (31)
However, if agents always intend to recruit, the solution is given by S(ψ0) = U ,
where ψ0 > ψ1; this value for ψ0 is denoted as ψˇ0. The explicit solution for ψˇ0
depends on the parameterization of p(y).
The minimum productivity required for an agent to leave unemployment for self-
employment, is thus:
ψ0 = min(ψ˜0, ψˇ0) (32)
φ(y) is the solution to the equality S(y) = W (φ(y)). Differentiating both sides
gives a neat ODE in φ(y), S′(y) = W ′(φ(y))φ′(y). Substituting in the expressions
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for the derivatives of the value functions, equations (27) and (28), gives the ODE:
φ′(y) =

(r+µ+δ+λ1F (φ(y))+η1Γ(y))
(r+µ) if y < ψ1
(r+2µ+δ+h(p′(y)−1))(r+µ+δ+λ1F (φ(y))+η1Γ(y))
(r+2µ+δ−h)(r+µ+h) if y ≥ ψ1
(33)
with the initial condition φ(ψ0) = φ0.
A.2 Solving for the Steady State
Differentiating equation (20) with respect to y gives:
Nuη0γ(y) +N
f
e η1G(φ(y))γ(y) =
{
µγs(y) if y < ψ1(
µ+ (µ+δ)Σ(1)
NsΓs(ψ1)
)
γs(y) if y ≥ ψ1 (34)
where, γs(y) =
d
dy {Γs(y)}.
This would be a straightforward ODE inNsΓ(y) if it was not for the term including
Nfe G(φ(y)). However one can isolate this term from the steady state condition for
paid employees, equation (21). Summing across equations (21) and (20) gives:
NsµΓs(y) + I{y≥ψ1}
(
(µ+ δ)Σ(1)
NsΓs(ψ1)
)
(Γs(y)− Γs(ψ1))+ (35)
NeG(φ(y))
[
µ+ δ + λ1F (φ(y)) + η1Γ(y)
]
= Nu [η0Γ(y)− η0Γ(ψ0) + λ0F (φ(y))]
where I{y≥ψ1} is an indicator function taking the value one if {y ≥ ψ1} is satisfied
and zero otherwise.
The Markov process that determines the size of the firm is determined only by µ
and h. Thus the ergodic distribution of self-employed firm sizes can be computed for
a given h and µ by simulating the Markov process for a sufficiently long period. Let
s(`) be the distribution of employee numbers amongst the self-employed then the
measure Σ(`) is given by the distribution weighted by the number of self-employed
who intend to recruit (of productivity greater than ψ1).
NsΓ(ψ1).s(`) (36)
Nse the number of paid employees employed by the self-employed is given by the
accounting identity in equation (37).
Nse =
∞∑
`=1
Σ(`)` (37)
Solving for the steady state is fairly cumbersome and requires an iterative solution.
Initially s(`) is computed by simulating the Markov process. The outer loop iterates
around the measure of potential recruiters NsΓ(ψ1) and the inner loop around the
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measure of unemployed. An initial guess is made regarding the number of potential
recruiters, from which Σ(`) is calculated (equation (36)) and so is Nse (equation
(37)). In the inner loop the ODE (34) with the initial condition Γs(ψ0) = 0 is
solved, where Nfe G(φ(y)) is imputed using equation (35). Then, Nu is updated
according to equation (18). Once the procedure converges to a solution it goes to
the outer loop. The number of potential recruiters has only been used to determine
the measure Σ(`) (and Nse ), it is updated using the solution to the differential
equation in the inner loop. The whole process is iterated on until stable.
A.3 Misreporting of Earnings by Self-Employed
The data on income that is relied upon in the estimation are collected from survey
data. While there are no clear incentives to lie about one’s income in a survey, where
there would be, to say, tax authorities, there exists a literature that suggests people
answer or behave differently when being studied. This is commonly known as the
Hawthorne effect [8]. To calculate the degree of misreporting, this subsection follows
the methodology proposed by Hurst et al (2014). Relying on consumption and
income data, which are obtained from the Expenditure and Food Survey (EFS),
information is obtained about total personal weekly consumption, gross weekly
income, the employment status of the individual and a variety of demographic
information. The sample is restricted to males in employment.
There are four identifying assumptions that allows the uncovering of the degree
of misreporting. The income and expenditure relationship is governed by the log-
linear Engel curve. Self-employed agents systematically misreport their earnings
by a factor κs, it need not be assumed that κs ≤ 1 and paid employees provide
an unbiased reporting of their income. Finally, both the self-employed and paid
employees provide unbiased reports of total expenditure.
Following the notation of Hurst et al (2014), k denotes the employment status,
(k = S) implies an individual is self-employed and (k = W ) implies he is a paid
employee, individual i has preferences that generate the log-linear Engel curve given
by equation (38).
log cik = α+ β log y
p
ik + Θ
′Xik + ik (38)
ypik is the permanent income of individual i in labor market state k, β is the
income elasticity and Xit is a vector of demographic controls. The vector of controls
include: a series of five year age dummies; a dummy for if the individual is white; a
dummy for if the individual is married; and the number of children an individual has.
Estimating (38) is problematic as the self-employed are systematically misreporting
their income and the income that is observed is an individual’s transitory rather
than permanent income. It is assumed that reported income is governed by:
log yiW = log y
p
iW + Ω
′XiW + υiW (39)
log yiS = log κs + log y
p
iS + Ω
′XiS + υiS (40)
[8]For a comprehensive assessment of this phenomenon, see Levitt and List (2011).
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It is assumed that υ has mean zero and is orthogonal to the unobserved deter-
minants of consumption . The self-employed are also systematically misreporting
their income by a factor κs. Rearranging equations (38), (39) and (40), gives the
following, where κs can be backed out as κs = exp(−γ/β):
log cik = α+ β log yik + γDi + ΨXik + ξik (41)
Di is a dummy variable taking the value one if individual i is self-employed,
Ψ = Θ − β′Ω and the unobservable component is given by ξik = ik − βυik.
Even in the absence of measurement error, transitory income fluctuations governed
by equations (39) and (40) introduce attenuation bias in the estimate of β since
E[log yikξik] 6= 0. To overcome this problem, the age at which an individual left full
time education is used as an instrument for reported income. Year left education
is split into five categories: left before 16; left at 16 or 17; left at 18; left at 19 or
20; and left at 21 or over. Thus, for these instruments to be valid it is assumed
that education affects consumption only through changes in permanent income.
The results of κs, γ and β are given in Table 10, using ordinary least squares and
the preferred instrumental variables estimation procedure.
INSERT TABLE 10 HERE
Standard errors in parentheses are obtained using a bootstrap procedure, redraw-
ing the sample with repetition 500 times. The estimation is based upon earnings
for the self-employed which have been adjusted by the factor κs.
A.4 Transition Rate Moment Conditions
The model is in continuous time, with one unit representing a month. Empirically
we observe the monthly rate, the moment and its theoretical counterpart are given
below:
Unemployment to paid employment: 1− exp(−λ0 − λs0)
Unemployment to own account self-employment: 1− exp (−η0Γ(ψ0)))
Paid employment (in large firm) to unemployment: 1− exp(−δ)
Paid employment (any) to unemployment: 1−exp(− Nse
Nse+N
f
e
(µ+δ)− Nfe
Nse+N
f
e
δ)
Paid employment to another paid employer: 1−exp(− Nfe λ1
Nfe +Nse
∫∞
φ0
F (x)dG(x))
Paid employment to own account self-employment: 1−exp(− Nfe η1
Nfe +Nse
∫∞
ψ0
Γ(x)dG(φ(x)))
Own account self-employment to recruiter: 1− exp(−hΓs(ψ1))
Note, λs0, the arrival rate of job offers to the unemployed from self-employed re-
cruiters is given by:
λs0 =
h (Nse + Σ (0))
Nu
The numerator is the total number of hires and the denominator is the mass of
potential recipients.
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1a labelled simpaidemp.eps 1b labelled simselfemp.eps 1c labelled simunemp.eps
Figure 1: Change in Employment from Intervention
Tables
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2a labelled simproppaid.eps 2b labelled simproprec.eps
Figure 2: Change in Employment Composition from Intervention
Table 1: Composition
Paid Own- Recruiter
Employment Account
Employment Share 82.8% 12.6% 4.6%
Mean Hours Worked per week 40.39 43.34 51.68
Raw Data
Mean Earnings 10.69 9.34 11.14
Standard dev. of Earnings 3.88 5.81 10.44
Adjusted Data
Median Earnings 9.92 13.20 14.93
Mean Earnings 10.69 15.71 18.72
Standard dev. of Earnings 3.88 9.76 17.55
Note 1:Employment shares are measured as the proportion employed in that state amongst all those
employed.
Note 2:Earnings are measured in £/ hour.
Table 2: Transition Matrix: 2004-2008
Unemployment Small Paid Large Paid Own Recruiter
Employment Employment Account
Unemployment — 0.0009 0.0899 0.0066 0.0019
Paid Employment (s) 0.0160 0.0160 0.0841 0.0053 0.0027
Paid Employment (l) 0.0034 0.0002 0.0079 0.0009 0.0000
Own Account 0.0011 0.0000 0.0056 — 0.0027
Recruiter 0.0007 0.0000 0.0043 0.0108 —
Note 1: Transition rates are (continuous time) monthly. Rows do not add up to one. The entries along
the diagonal are the fractions of individuals changing jobs within their current labor market status
Note 2: Large paid employment is defined as being employed in an establishment that has 25 or more
employees.
Note 3: Rates in bold are ones in which the model is able to replicate.
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Table 3: Private Sector Firm Size distri-
bution 2006
Firm size # of firms Percent
Total 2,084,495 100
0-4 1,391,960 66.78
5-9 317,745 15.24
10 - 19 178,820 8.58
20 - 49 120,870 5.80
50 - 99 41,905 2.01
100 - 249 23,100 1.11
250 - 499 6,740 0.32
500 - 999 2,440 0.12
1000 or more 915 0.04
Source: ONS.
Table 4: Self-employed recruiter’s size dis-
tribution 2004-08
Firm size # of firms Percent
Total 151 100
1-2 65 43.05
3-9 65 43.05
10 - 24 15 9.93
25 - 49 1 0.66
50 - 99 0 0
100 - 199 1 0.66
200 - 499 1 0.66
500 - 999 1 0.66
1000 or more 2 1.32
Source: BHPS.
Table 5: Weighted Regressions by Industry Classification.
Non-unemployment exit rate Mean (log) Wage
Coefficient −0.033
(0.0008)
−0.84
(0.016)
Constant 0.014
(0.00005)
2.4
(0.00092)
Notes: The explanatory variable in each case is the proportion of self-employed recruiters.
Dependent variables are the heading of each column. Regression weighted by the paid employment
level in each one digit industry, standard errors given in parenthesis.
Table 6: Parameter Estimates
δ η0 η1 µ
0.0034
(0.0003)
0.0066
(0.0002)
0.0011
(0.00002)
0.0107
(0.0002)
a b
−6.53
(0.77)
−11.50
(1.42)
h hf N κ
0.0070
(0.0001)
2.7305
(0.1069)
0.0138
(0.0005)
0.4075
(0.0119)
my sy β
2.4796
(0.0927)
0.2689
(0.0242)
1.6740
(0.0315)
Notes: Given in the parentheses are the bootstrapped standard errors.
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Table 7: Fit of Deciles of the Earnings Dis-
tribution for Own Account Workers
Decile Theoretical Empirical
Moment Moment
10% 7.3556 6.1111
20% 9.0002 7.8725
30% 10.4178 9.7059
40% 11.8070 11.4559
50% 13.2911 13.1993
60% 14.9602 15.6732
70% 17.0026 18.2312
80% 19.7461 21.1564
90% 24.2895 27.0048
Table 8: Fit of Deciles of the Earnings Dis-
tribution for Recruiting Self-Employed
Decile Theoretical Empirical
Moment Moment
10% 1.5080 2.8799
20% 4.5268 5.6617
30% 7.9110 8.6274
40% 9.6422 10.6302
50% 13.6360 14.9321
60% 18.0819 18.0795
70% 22.4150 21.5686
80% 29.7773 24.2646
90% 45.3309 48.5292
Table 9: Proportion of Paid Employees in Firms of given size or Less
Firm Theoretical Empirical
Size Moment Moment
2 0.0312 0.0387
9 0.0358 0.1916
24 0.1198 0.3288
49 0.3122 0.4765
99 0.5656 0.5883
199 0.9031 0.6956
499 1.0000 0.8429
999 1.0000 0.9234
Table 10: Fraction of Under Reported Income by Self-Employed
IV OLS
β 0.913
(0.184)
0.368
(0.049)
γ 0.474
(0.117)
0.264
(0.090)
κs 0.595
(0.065)
0.489
(0.124)
